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The Thai 30 Baht program was one of the largest health system reforms ever undertaken by a low-middle
income country. In addition to lowering the cost of care for the previously uninsured in public facilities,
it also entailed a fourfold increase in funding provided to hospitals to care for the poorest 30% of the
population (who were already publicly insured). For the previously uninsured, we find that the 30
Baht program led to increased health care utilization, as well as a shift from private to public sources
of care. But, we find a larger increase for the poor who were previously publicly insured, especially
amongst infants and women of childbearing age. Using vital statistics records, we find that the increased
access to healthcare by the publicly insured poor led to a reduction in their infant mortality of at least
6.5 per 1,000 births. This suggests significant improvements in infant mortality rates can be achieved
through increased access to healthcare services for the poor and marginalized groups.
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Over the last several decades, many developing countries have either considered or imple-
mented health reform which provides universal healthcare access for their citizens.1 Often,
reform focuses on the extension of insurance to the uninsured. However, this ignores a sec-
ond dimension of health reform: the reimbursement to hospitals for existing public programs.
This is especially important in developing countries, which often have public programs for
their poorest citizens that are strained for funding. Since the poorest citizens are often also
the sickest citizens, the structure and reimbursement of their programs can be just as, if not
more, important than the extention of insurance to the previously uninsured.
One of the countries which illustrates these complex issues associated with health reform
is Thailand. In 2001, Thailand implemented the 30 Baht program, one of the largest, most
ambitious reforms ever undertaken by a developing country. Prior to 30 Baht, roughly 30%
of Thailand was not insured through any existing program and was required to pay out-of-
pocket for healthcare utilization. But like many developing countries, Thailand had a pre-
existing program which provided free care to the poor.2 The Medical Welfare Scheme (MWS)
covered another 30% of the population and was arguably underfunded with re-imbursements
to public hospitals of roughly 250 Baht (~$6) per enrollee per year (Damrongplasit and
Melnick [2009]; Donaldson et al. [1999]).
The 30 Baht reform, which began in 2001, had two important features. First, it allowed
otherwise uninsured individuals to obtain healthcare in public facilities for only 30 Baht
(~$0:75) per disease. Second, it ﬁnanced the care by providing a 1,200 Baht (~$30) payment
to public hospitals per non-privately insured patient, regardless of the actual utilization of
those patients. This represented a dramatic fourfold increase in funding for those previously
enrolled in the MWS program. Thus, not only did the program lower the cost of care for
1A non-exhaustive list of low and middle-income countries implementing large-scale health reforms which
seek universal coverage include Brazil in 1988, Israel 1995, Taiwan 1995, Thailand in 2001, and most recently
Peru in 2010.
2Although the poor was the primary focus of the program the young (1-15), old (>60), students (13-15),
along with local village heads were also eligible to enroll.
1the previously uninsured; it also dramatically increased the reimbursement to hospitals for
treating low income patients.
In this paper, we investigate the impacts of both extending insurance coverage to the
previously uninsured and increasing the reimbursement for the publicly insured poor in
Thailand. We begin by investigating the impact of the 30 Baht reform on medical utilization.
Using data on inpatient utilization, we ﬁnd that the program led to a moderate increase in
healthcare utilization for the previously uninsured. However, we ﬁnd a larger impact for those
who were previously insured by the low income MWS program, for whom there was rising
hospital reimbursement. The impacts for both groups are concentrated in public hospitals,
which is consistent with the targeting of the funds. Moreover, for the previously uninsured
we ﬁnd evidence of a switch in utilization from private to public facilities, consistent with a
response to the decrease in relative price of care in public versus private facilities induced by
the 30 Baht program. Finally, we show that the increase in utilization for the MWS enrollees
is especially large amongst infants and women of childbearing age (20-30).
We then turn our focus to infant mortality. Across countries, there is a broad negative
relationship between income and infant mortality.3 While some have argued this link to
be causal (Pritchett and Summers [1996]), the channel by which an increase in income
yields lower infant mortality is less well-known (e.g. increased healthcare expenditure versus
improved nutrition). Previous studies have established a cross-sectional correlation between
the provision of health services and infant mortality, conditional on country-level income
(Anand and Barnighausen [2004]). But, to our knowledge there are no studies examining
the causal impact of a large scale increase in access to medical care on infant mortality in a
low-middle income country.
We use the 30 Baht program to estimate a lower bound on the causal impact of the
increased access to care for the MWS enrollees on their infant mortality by focusing on
the relationship between the fraction of a province enrolled in the MWS program and the
3Pritchett and Summers [1996] estimate a long-run elasticity of income on infant mortality ranging from
-0.2 to -0.4.
2trends in their infant mortality rates. Our results suggest the increased access to medical
services for the poor led to a signiﬁcant reduction in their infant mortality. Using vital
statistics records from the Thailand Ministry of Public Health, we ﬁrst document a robust
positive correlation between the fraction of a province enrolled in the MWS program and
the provincial infant mortality rate in each of the 4 years prior to 2001 for which we were
able to obtain data. In other words, prior to 30 Baht the negative relationship between
income and infant mortality holds across provinces within Thailand. However, after the 30
Baht program, this correlation evaporates and is statistically indistinguishable from zero in
years 2002-2008 (both in each year and jointly). We estimate that the 30 Baht program,
which provided a funding increase of less than $25 per capita, led to a reduction in infant
mortality amongst the poor in Thailand of at least 6.5 per 1,000 births. Since the MWS
group is roughly 30% of the population, this implies an aggregate reduction in Thailand’s
infant mortality rate of at least 2 per 1,000 births.
Our paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present background on the 30 Baht pro-
gram. Section 3 presents a theoretical model of the impacts of the demand and reimburse-
ment changes put in place by this program. In Section 4 we present results of the estimates
of the impact of the program on inpatient healthcare utilization. Section 5 examines the
impact of the program on infant mortality. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Thai 30 Baht Program
2.1 Background
In 2001, Thailand became one of the ﬁrst low-middle income countries to implement a
universal health coverage scheme. Long a goal of liberal reformers, universal coverage was a
key element of the political platform of Thaksin Shinawatra, a populist leader who came to
power in February 2001. Making quick work of this promise, the 30 Baht program ensured
3every Thai citizen access to low cost health services in public facilities by the fall of 2001.4
As discussed in the introduction, the 30 Baht program had two key features. It not only
allowed nearly everyone access to care in public facilities for a cost of 30 Baht (~$0.75) per
disease, but it also sought to remove a historical inequity in the provision of healthcare in
Thailand by equalizing the per-person resources available for healthcare in public hospitals.
The Thai government computed the number of individuals in the province who were either
uninsured or publicly insured through the MWS program. It then transferred to provincial
hospitals in each year $1,200 Baht (~30) per person in these categories, regardless of actual
utilization by that population.5 So hospitals moved from a system of collecting reimburse-
ment from the uninsured, and receiving a small government reimbursement for the publicly
insured, to a system where both groups were reimbursed at 1,200 Baht.
The 30 Baht program was introduced in the context of a disparate system of health care
access. About 20% of the Thai population was enrolled in two employer-based insurance
programs that were left largely untouched by the 30 Baht program. The Civil Servant
Medical Beneﬁciary Scheme (CSMBS) provided free care to civil servants and their families
in public facilities. The Social Security Scheme (SSS) provided free care to other formal sector
workers (program was mandatory for formal sector employers). Because these programs were
left unchanged around the introduction of 30 Baht, the combination of these two groups will
provide a natural control group for portions of our analysis.6
Another 30% of the population were enrolled in the Medical Welfare Scheme (MWS), a
government program for the poor, young (ages 1-15) and elderly (ages 60+).7 Prior to 30
Baht, this program was arguably underfunded, with a global budget of only 250 Baht (~$6)
4The program began with several pilot provinces in early 2001, expanding to more pilots throughout the
summer and covering all provinces by November 2001.
5Public hospitals in Thailand are managed primarily at the provincial level. Each province has one major
hospital, along with numerous smaller hospitals (usually 1 per Amphoe/County) and clinics.
6A very small fraction (~1%) of the population, primarily upper class workers in Bangkok, has private
insurance coverage. We exclude this group in our inpatient utilization analysis.
7The program also covered the handicapped (all ages) and religious and community leaders. The deﬁnition
for eligibility based on income (the relevant eligibility criteria for most members) was an income threshold
of 2,000 Baht per person or 2,800 Baht per household (~$2.25/day)
4per enrollee per year (Donaldson et al. [1999]). When the 30 Baht program began in 2001,
MWS enrollees were automatically enrolled in the 30 Baht program, but waived of its 30
Baht copay. As a result of absorbing this program into the 30 Baht program, funding to
public hospitals to care for the poor increased from a global budget of 250 Baht per enrollee
to the 1,200 Baht per enrollee, a four-fold increase (~$25).
The remaining 50% of the population was not covered under any of the above programs.
However, they did have access to a previously existing government program, the 500 Baht
program, which allowed households to obtain free care in public facilities for a cost of 500
Baht per household per year with no underwriting restrictions.8 About two-ﬁfths of the
uninsured (or 20% of the total population) took up this option.
Thus, for the previously uninsured, the 30 Baht program lowered the cost of public
healthcare from a maximum of 500 Baht per household per year to 30 Baht per disease (a
cost reduction in the vast majority of cases). From the public hospital’s perspective the 30
Baht program replaced these out-of-pocket payments and 500 Baht payments (which were
matched with an additional 500 Baht from the central govt) with the 1,200 Baht per person
capitation.
Figure 1 summarizes the three groups in the population and the way in which each was
aﬀected by the 30 Baht program. The UNINS faced a price reduction for care but also
provided less revenue to hospitals. The MWS faced no change in the price of obtaining care,
but the funding to hospitals signiﬁcantly increased. The Control group (CSMBS and SSS)
had no formal change to their programs around the introduction of 30 Baht.
3 Theoretical Impacts of the 30 Baht Program
We provide a stylized model to clarify the varying forces at play and highlight the potential
impacts of the 30 Baht program on utilization and health. We suppose each group (e.g.
8Not every service was free under the 500 Baht program or the 30 Baht program (e.g. dialysis was not
covered in 2001). The set of covered procedures for 30 Baht was essentially the same set of procedures
covered under the 500 Baht and MWS programs.
5MWS, UNINS) has a representative agent with an additively separable utility function,
U (h;c) = u(c) + v (h), where u is the utility from consumption, c, and v is the agent’s
health which is produced through the utilization of health services, h.9 We assume u and v
are twice diﬀerentiable, increasing, and strictly concave. Health services are provided by two
sources: public health services, hpub, and private health services, hpriv, so that h = hpriv+hpub.
We normalize units of health services, hpriv, and consumption, c, so that prices are equal to
1. We assume hpriv, hpub, c  0 .
We assume public hospitals produce public care, hpub, at a cost of 1. But, government
programs aﬀect the supply of public care. Speciﬁcally, we assume care at public hospitals is
oﬀered at price p but is subject to a budget constraint,
hpub  phpub + b
where b captures funds provided from the government for the care of a given group. Note
that if p  1, the budget constraint does not limit care. But if p < 1, so that care is provided
below cost, then the amount of public care provided by the hospitals is limited by the size





Given this environment, the representative agent for a given group chooses hpub, hpriv,
and c, to maximize u(hpub + hpriv;c) subject to two constraints: the supply constraint (1)
and the budget constraint
phpub + hpriv + c  W
where W is agent’s wealth. By varying the parameters (p;b;W), the model provides predic-
tions for the impacts of the 30 Baht program on the two groups (MWS and UNINS).10
9Additive separability is only a stylistic assumption which renders more straightforward predictions about
the program on health.
10By modeling each group as having separate parameters, (p;b;W), we rule out the potential that hospitals
cross-subsidize groups. One could allow the hospital to spend an increase in the provincial budget for the
MWS on non-MWS patients in the province. But, we have tested for and found no evidence of such
6UNINS We assume the UNINS have wealth W U which does not vary over time. Prior to 30
Baht, the uninsured paid out-of-pocket for care and had the option of purchasing a 500 Baht
card. For simplicity, we abstract from the nonlinear pricing and assume stylistically that
pU;Pre = 1.11 In reality, our interviews with households and doctors suggest public and private
care have relative advantages; public hospitals are generally better suited for complicated
cases, whereas private facilities tend to be faster and more convenient. Assuming a price of
one captures their substitutability and is also broadly consistent with our interviews with
hospital administrators and existing literature which suggests the UNINS tended to cover
their hospital expenses at public facilities (Donaldson et al. [1999]).



















priv + cU;Pre  W U, determines




priv . Because public and private
healthcare utilization have the same price, the uninsured are indiﬀerent between public and
private utilization.
After 30 Baht, the price of public healthcare is reduced to 30 Baht (~$0.75), which in
the model we consider to be eﬀectively zero: p30B  0. To fund care, the government
provides a payment to hospitals b30B > 0, so that the government budget constraint is given
by h
U;Post
pub  b30B. Thus, as long as the marginal utility of public healthcare utilization is
positive, the agent will consume the maximum amount of public care, h
U;Post
pub = b30B. Private
utilization, h
U;Post
priv , optimizes the tradeoﬀ between an additional unit of consumption and an
spillovers; for example, the increase in utilization we will ﬁnd for the MWS patients appears to be uniform
across provinces and does not vary systematically with the fraction of the province enrolled in the MWS
program. Moreover, we will show all of our results are robust to the inclusion of provincial-by-year ﬁxed
eﬀects, which would control for any provincial-level budgetary impacts.
11We use superscripts to denote reference to the group (MWS vs UNINS) and time period (pre 30 Baht
and post 30 Baht).


















and consumption is then given by cU;Post = W U  h
U;Post
priv . Overall health utilization is given





The model makes two predictions about the impact of the 30 Baht program on healthcare
utilization of the UNINS. First, because the price of public utilization has gone down and





Second, depending on the size of the 30 Baht subsidy, b30B, the program can lead to an
increase or a decrease in private utilization. If the 30 Baht payment b30B were suﬃciently
small, then agents will compensate by seeking additional care in private facilities. But, if
b30B is suﬃciently large, then the 30 Baht program will crowd out private care.
MWS For the MWS, pMWS = 0 both before and after 30 Baht. Prior to 30 Baht, the
government provides a small but positive amount of funds bMWS > 0, roughly 250 Baht ($6),
for their (Donaldson et al. [1999]). Because care is free, the MWS recieve h
MWS;Pre
pub = bMWS.
Since the MWS enrollees are quite poor, we stylistically assume that wMWS  0. This
implies that the MWS do not utilize any care in the private market because the marginal











priv = 0 so that overall utilization is given by hMWS;Pre = h
MWS;Pre
pub .
The 30 Baht program increases the funding provided to hospitals to provide care: b30B >
bMWS. MWS agents will now choose h
MWS;Post
pub = b30B, an increase in care, and they continue




priv = 0. Thus, the MWS have
no change in private utilization and overall utilization is given by hMWS;Post = b30B.12
Cross-group Health Comparisons Prior to 30 Baht, the small funding of the MWS
program implies that utilization for the MWS group is lower than for the UNINS. Thus, the





. Provided that the 30 Baht program is suﬃciently funded (i.e. b30B is suﬃciently
large) so that h
U;Post
priv = 0, both groups will choose total healthcare utilization of b30B so that
the 30 Baht program will lead to an equalization of the marginal value of healthcare services













Summary of Model Predictions For the uninsured, the reduction in the price of care
should lead to an increase in their healthcare utilization. The increase in public utilization
is bounded by the public hospitals’ resources under 30 Baht. If the provision of public care
under 30 Baht is large enough, then it may lead to a crowd-out of private care. For the MWS,
the increase in the supply of healthcare translates to an increase in utilization, despite no
change in the price of care in public facilities. Finally, the model suggests that 30 Baht can
lead to an equalization in of health outcomes (and the marginal value of healthcare) between
the UNINS and MWS.
With this framework in mind, the remainder of this paper discusses the impact of the 30
Baht program on healthcare utilization and infant mortality.
12The prediction of zero private care usage for the MWS is a simpliﬁation. A richer model which allows
for imperfect substitutability between private and public care would generate our testable predictions and
still deliver some positive private utilization for the MWS. But, the result of zero private care for the MWS
is the result is qualitatively consistent with the data, which shows MWS use signiﬁcantly less (about half)
public care than the UNINS (both before and after 30 Baht).
94 Healthcare Utilization
4.1 Data and Sample
We begin our analysis of the 30 Baht program with its eﬀects on inpatient utilization. We
use data from the Health and Welfare Survey (HWS) from years 2001 and 2003-2005.13 This
survey is a national cross section of all 76 Thai provinces14, with roughly equal sized samples
from each province. The survey provides a wide range of health utilization and insurance
coverage information. In particular, respondents are asked whether or not they have been
admitted as an inpatient in the last 12 months, which will be our measure of utilization.15
The survey also provides information on insurance status, including whether an individual
was part of the MWS, SSS/CSMBS, or UNINS in 2001, and whether an individual was part
of SSS/CSMBS or 30 Baht in 2003-2005. Although the survey is not a panel, it distinguishes
between individuals enrolled in the free care (no copay) version of the 30 Baht program (i.e.
the "roll-over" portion of the MWS) from those who must pay the 30 Baht copay (i.e. those
who were previously enrolled in the MWS program). This allows us to classify individuals
into the three groups (UNINS, MWS, CONTROL) in each year of the survey.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of our sample, broken out by group. We provide
the mean age, fraction female, and fraction employed (in any paying work, formal or informal)
before and after the 30 Baht program began (i.e. 2001 versus 2003-2005 in our sample). In
general, the means are similar, although not identical. The control group experiences a
signiﬁcant increase in age (~2 years) which is larger than the other groups (~1 year for
MWS and UNINS). The fraction employed increases for the CONTROL and UNINS groups
13We thank our partners at the University Thai Chamber of Commerce for compiling and translating this
survey into English.
14In 2001, the survey is conducted in April/May, roughly 5 months before the beginning of the 30 Baht
program in 70 of the 76 provinces. Six provinces took part in a pilot study which was underway in April/May
of 2001; we exclude these provinces in our analysis. An additional 15 provinces began a pilot study in June
of 2001, after the HWS was complete.
15The surveys also provide information for outpatient utilization and the presence of sickness, however the
recall window changes from 2 weeks in 2001 to 1 month in years 2003-2005. Since this recall window changes
over the same time period as the start of the 30 Baht program, we focus most of our results on inpatient
utilization.
10by about 2.5-3pp but less for the MWS (0.7pp). Gender shares remain virtually unchanged
in each group over time. We will be able to control for these demographic variables in our
regressions and assess the robustness of our results to their inclusion or exclusion.
4.2 Speciﬁcation and Results
Table 2 presents the means of 12 month inpatient utilization rate for the CONTROL, UNINS,
and MWS groups, broken out separately before and after the beginning of the 30 Baht
program in 2001. The top row shows that overall inpatient utilization increased by 0.36pp,
or roughly 5.4% over the pre-30 baht utilization rate of 6.65pp. Thus, the simple time series
estimate suggests the 30 Baht program led to an increase in overall inpatient utilization.
Breaking out the results by our three groups, we ﬁnd that the increase in overall utilization
is primarily driven by an increase in utilization by the MWS group. The utilization rate
for the MWS group increases from 0.0711 to 0.0792, a diﬀerence of 0.0081 (p<0.01). For
the previously uninsured, we ﬁnd a modest, yet statistically insigniﬁcant increase of 0.0021
(~3% of baseline utilization of 0.0585). Finally, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant change for the control
group (-0.0004). This is reassuring since these programs were technically unaﬀected by the
introduction of the 30 Baht program.
The bottom two rows show the estimated diﬀerence in utilization between the treatment
groups and the CONTROL group. The results show that the UNINS have lower utilization
than the CONTROL group both before (-0.0207) and after (-0.0182) the introduction of 30
Baht. This implies a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimate of 0.0025 (p>0.10), which suggests the
30 Baht program had a modest but statistically insigniﬁcant impact on inpatient utilization.
For the MWS group, prior to 30 Baht this group had signiﬁcantly lower utilization rates than
the CONTROL group (-0.0085); after 30 Baht, the diﬀerence is positive and statistically
insigniﬁcant (0.0003; p>0.10). This implies a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimate of 0.0088
(p<0.01), which implies that the 30 Baht program led to a 12% increase in utilization for
the MWS group.
11The analysis heretofore has not included any controls for demographics, which are poten-
tially important given the nonzero changes in sample composition outlined in Table 1. We
estimate regressions of the form
inpatigt = 
UNINS  UNINSg  Post30t + 
MWSMWSg  Post30t + (2)
+t + g + Xigt  + igt
where subscripts i index individuals, g indexes insurance groups (e.g. UNINS, MWS, CON-
TROL), and t indexes year (2001, 2003, 2004, 2005). The variable inpatigt is an indicator for
inpatient utilization in the past 12 months, t is a year ﬁxed eﬀect, g is a group ﬁxed eﬀect
(MWS, UNINS, CONTROL), and Xigt is a set of demographic control variables including
age deciles interacted with gender and 15 household income bins16. The variables UNINSg
and MWSg are indicators for the previously uninsured and MWS group, and Post30t is an
indicator for years 2003-200517. The coeﬃcient UNINS and MWS capture the diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerence estimate of the impact of the program on the previously uninsured and the MWS
group.
The results in Table 3 largely support the ﬁndings of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence spec-
iﬁcation of a large increase in utilization for the MWS and a more modest eﬀect on the
previously uninsured. Our estimate of 0.0086 (p<0.01), an increase of 12%, for the MWS
group in column I remains very similar to the results in Table 2. For the UNINS, we now
estimate a slightly larger (and now statistically signiﬁcant) increase in inpatient utilization
of 0.0048 (p<0.05), an increase of 8% over the baseline utilization rate of 0.0585 in 2001.
Column II adds province-by-year ﬁxed eﬀects which capture potential provincial-level
supply or demand shocks, such as the opening of a new private clinic or an outbreak of
sickness. Since these ﬁxed eﬀects may be soaking up causal impacts of the program (e.g.
16One concern with including household income is that it may be a causal outcome of an increase in
healthcare utilization. Our results do not change signiﬁcantly with or without income controls.
17We aggregate these post 30 Baht years for statistical power. Separate estimates by year are very similar
but have wider standard errors.
12a private clinic may be less likely to open because of the 30 Baht program), we do not
include these controls in our primary speciﬁcation. But it is re-assuring that including
these additional controls does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect our results. We estimate an increase of
0.0076 (p<0.05) for the MWS and 0.0044 (p<0.05) for the previously uninsured, statistically
indistinguishable from our results without province-by-year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Private vs. Public Utilization The 30 Baht program provided free care only in public,
not private hospitals. Columns III and IV present separate estimates for inpatient utilization
in public and private hospitals. Re-assuringly, we ﬁnd the increase in utilization for the MWS
group is entirely concentrated in public utilization (0.0081, p<0.01) as opposed to private
utilization (0.0009, p>0.10).
Moreover, this breakout reveals that the program led to a substitution of public for private
utilization amongst the previously uninsured: we ﬁnd an increase of 0.0068 (p<0.01) in public
utilization and a decrease of -0.0017 (p<0.10) in private utilization. This is consistent with
public options becoming relatively less expensive as a result of the 30 Baht program.
Women and Children In addition to analyzing the impact on each group as a whole,
we can also analyze the impact for subgroups. Setting the stage for our subsequent focus on
infant mortality, we focus on women aged 20-30 and infants aged 0-1. Columns V present
results of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence speciﬁcation restricted to a sample of only women aged
20-30 and infants; Column VI presents the results from the complementary sample of those
who are neither women aged 20-30 or infants.
The results suggest that the 30 Baht program had a disproportionate impact on the
utilization of women of childbearing age and infants, especially amongst the MWS group. In
particular, among the MWS we ﬁnd an increase of 0.0217 (p<0.05) for women aged 20-30
and infants, compared to an increase of 0.0085 (p<0.05) for the rest of the MWS group. We
also ﬁnd a larger increase amongst women aged 20-30 and infants for the UNINS (0.0065
versus 0.0052), although the increase for women and children is not statistically signiﬁcant
13(arguably due to the smaller sample size).
In short, our results suggest signiﬁcant increases in utilization for the UNINS, but gen-
erally larger increases for the MWS, and among the MWS an especially large increase in
utilization for women aged 20-30 and infants.
5 Infant Mortality Speciﬁcation and Results
Our results heretofore suggest that the 30 Baht program led to an increased access to care
for those previously enrolled in the MWS. What eﬀect did this have on outcomes? In this
section, we provide a lower bound estimate of the impact of the 30 Baht program on infant
mortality for the MWS group and for the aggregate impact on mortality.
5.1 Data
We obtained 1-year infant mortality rates at the province level from 1997-2008 complied
from death certiﬁcate registries made available by the Thailand Ministry of Public Health18.
In many developing countries, vital statistics registries are extremely incomplete. However,
Thailand has been recognized as a leader in vital statistics registries among low and middle-
income countries (Setel et al. [2007]), making it uniquely well-suited for assessing the impact
of the expansion of medical access to the poor on infant mortality.
However, as is even a problem in richer countries, under-reporting of deaths remains a
signiﬁcant concern, especially among infants.Table 4 reports two average mortality rates that
illustrate this potential concern. The ﬁrst column reports the average mortality rate based
on death registry records kept by the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH), which are the
rates that we use in our analysis. The second column reports the estimated country-level
infant mortality rate from the World Bank Development Indicator database. The latter
is generally thought to not suﬀer under-reporting issues, as it combines information from
18We merge with provincial GDP data (“Gross Provincial Product” data) from the National Statistics
Oﬃce which province provincial level GDP data for use as controls in our regressions.
14household surveys (conducted infrequently - about every 5-10 years), the vital statistics
registry, and modeling assumptions to attempt to remove the impact of under-reporting.
The signiﬁcant under-reporting in the vital statistics database is driven by the fact that
many infant deaths, especially those occuring outside of a hospital, often go un-recorded
(Tangcharoensathien et al. [2006]). For deaths occuring at the hospital, medical death cer-
tiﬁcates are issued on the spot and automatically recorded in the death registry. But if a
death occurs outside the hospital, the head of household and head of the village must ﬁle
a death notiﬁcation report to the local government registrar, an action that is not always
taken.
As we will discuss further below, because the 30 Baht program led to an increase in
hospital utilization in areas with more MWS people, infant mortality under-reporting likely
imposes a bias against ﬁnding that the 30 Baht program reduced infant mortality, since the
program could have increased reported infant mortality indirectly by increasing healthcare
utilization by the MWS. So although we would ideally have no such measurement error, it
is reassuring that it likely renders our results to be a lower bound on the impact of the 30
Baht program on infant mortality.
5.2 Provincial-level Speciﬁcation
Ideally, we would obtain individual-level infant mortality data which could be matched to
health scheme (i.e. MWS, UNINS, CONTROL). We would then run a regression of the
death of an infant conditional on birth in the past year, digt, on our diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
speciﬁcation,
digt = 
UNINS  10  UNINSg  Post30t + 
MWS  10  MWSg  Post30t + (3)
+t + g + igt
15where we multiply the terms UNINS and MWS by 10 for comparability to the 1/1000 infant
mortality rate which we use below.
Unfortunately, our infant mortality data is only available at the provincial level. We
therefore rely on a provincial-level identiﬁcation strategy. Averaging equation (3) across




p  Post30t + 
MWS
MWS







p +  pt
where infantmortpt is the 1/1000 infant mortality rate in province p in year t, UNINS
p is
the fraction of the province which is previously uninsured, and MWS
p is the fraction of the
province previously enrolled in the MWS program. In principle, with data on the provincial
shares, UNINS
p and MWS
p , one could estimate the impact for both the MWS and previously
uninsured. However, in practice, UNINS
p and MWS
p are highly negatively correlated (-0.85),
a mechanical result of the fact that the sum of the fractions enrolled in MWS, UNINS,
and CONTROL must equal 1. Therefore, with our data from just 76 provinces, we cannot
separately identify the impact on both the MWS and UNINS.
Instead, we devise an empirical strategy to identify a lower bound for the impact of the





p  Post30t + p + t + pt (5)
where we include provincial ﬁxed eﬀects, p, and year ﬁxed eﬀects, t. Figure 2 plots the
distribution of MWS
p , showing substantial variation with a standard deviation of 0.11 (largely
reﬂecting the unequal distribution of income across provinces). In some speciﬁcations we will
also include time-varying provincial characteristics, which will consist of provincial-level GDP
and 1-year lagged GDP.













Provided that the 30 Baht program did not lead to an increase in infant mortality, we will






< 0 (recall the correlation was -0.85), it is
clear that FracMWS  MWS, so that FracMWS understates the true impact of the 30 Baht
program on the infant mortality of the MWS group.
5.3 Results
Historical Relationship Between Income and Infant Mortality Before presenting
our primary regression results from the speciﬁcation given by equation 5, we ﬁrst use a simple
speciﬁcation to document the historical inequality in infant mortality rates across provinces
and its changes around the introduction of the 30 Baht program. We estimate separate
regressions for each year t = 1997;:::;2008 of the form





where infantmortpt is the 1-year infant mortality rate (per 1000 births) in province p in year
t. The coeﬃcient ~ FracMWS
t captures cross-provincial the relationship between the fraction
enrolled in the MWS program in 2001 and the infant mortality rate (deaths per 1,000 births)
of the province in year t.
Figure 3 plots the coeﬃcients for each year. The cross-provincial relationship within
Thailand prior to 30 Baht is broadly consistent with the cross-country negative relationship
between income and infant mortality. We ﬁnd a robust positive relationship between the
fraction MWS in a province and infant mortality: poorer provinces had higher infant mortal-
ity rates. But after 30 Baht, this relationship evaporates; the coeﬃcients for ~ FracMWS
t are
17essentially zero for every year after 30 Baht19. This suggests the program had a signiﬁcant
impact on infant mortality; it even suggests that the 30 Baht program removed the historical
cross-provincial correlation between FracMWS and infant mortality.
Impact of 30 Baht: Primary Empirical Speciﬁcation Our speciﬁcation in equation
(5) estimates the drop in ~ FracMWS
t around the introduction of 30 Baht in 2001 and also
includes current and lagged provincial GDP levels as controls. Our primary speciﬁcation
focuses on a 2 year window around the introduction of 30 Baht and excludes the year 2001
(since 30 Baht began in the middle of this year).
The results for FracMWS are presented in Table 5. We estimate a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of
-6.4512 (p<0.01), indicating the 30 Baht program led to a reduction in infant mortality for the
MWS group of at least 6.45 per 1,000 births. The remaining columns assess the robustness
of the coeﬃcient to alternative speciﬁcations. Column II removes controls for current and
lagged provincial GDP, Column III expands the analysis to a 4 year window (1997-2005)
and Column IV contracts the analysis to a 1 year window (2000-2002). Column V estimates
a median regression, as opposed to the standard mean regression, which is generally more
robust to the presence of outliers. We estimate a coeﬃcient of -7.6486 (p<0.05) in the
median regression speciﬁcation, statistically indistinguishable from our estimate of -6.4512
in the mean regression.
Finally, as mentioned in the previous subsection, one may be concerned that the 30 Baht
program signiﬁcantly impacted reporting of births and deaths. One may also be concerned
that there was some other change in vital statistics recording around the introduction of 30
Baht. To test this, we ask whether the 30 Baht program had any impact on recorded births
in the vital statistics registry. Column VI reports results from a regression of recorded births
using our primary speciﬁcation in equation (5). The results show that we cannot reject the
null hypothesis of no relationship between the 30 Baht program and recorded births. This is
19A joint test for all post 30 Baht coeﬃcients equal to zero cannot be rejected at any standard signiﬁcance
levels.
18reassuring and suggests results are not driven by changes in vital statistics recording around
the introduction of 30 Baht.
A remaining identiﬁcation concern is that there was something else implemented in 2001,
aside from the increased access to care associated with the 30 Baht program, that led to
the relative reduction in infant mortality in high MWS versus low MWS provinces. Most
notably, Thaksin came to power in 2001 under a populist, pro-poor platform. The 30 Baht
program was the cornerstone of the healthcare policy, but Thaksin also implemented various
economic policies to promote economic growth for the poor. In particular, the so-called
“Million Baht Fund”, analyzed in detail in Kaboski and Townsend [2009, 2011], provided
1 million baht to each village for use in micro-loans. Yet these loan funds were provided
uniformly across provinces, in contrast to the 30 Baht program which led to a diﬀerential
change in funding correlated with the fraction MWS in the province. Other concerns may
simply be that Thaksin implemented other policies which led to economic expansion in poorer
areas (i.e. with higher MWS). But, as shown in Table 6, our results are quite robust to the
inclusion of current and lagged provincial-level GDP variables, suggesting that changing
economic conditions does not explain the sharp reduction in infant mortality around the
introduction of the 30 Baht program. Thus, our results do not appear to be driven by other
contemporaneous factors correlated with the fraction of MWS enrollees in each province.
Measurement Error As shown in Table 4, infant mortality is signiﬁcantly under-reported
in the vital statistics registry. Here, we discuss how such under-reporting aﬀects the inter-
pretation of our results. In particular, we consider three plausible types of under-reporting.
All of these forms of measurement error render our estimate a lower bound for the impact
of the 30 Baht program on infant mortality for the MWS group.
First, suppose under-reporting is a level eﬀect, so that infantmortpt = ^ infantmortpt+at
where ^ infantmortpt is the vital statistics report and at > 0 is the under-reporting level by
year. In this case, at will be aborbed into the time ﬁxed eﬀect and will not introduce any
19bias into the estimates of FracMWS. Our estimate of 6.5 should be thought of as being
relative to the current average mortality rate of 15, and thus we estimate that the 30 Baht
program led to a reduction in the infant mortality rate of at least 6.5 relative to a pre-30
Baht baseline of 15+6.5=21.5, which is a 30% reduction in infant mortality. Multiplying
the estimate of 6.5 by the fraction of the population in the MWS group (~30%) implies an
aggregate reduction in infant mortality of at least 2 per 1,000 births.
Second, suppose under-reporting is proportional, so that infantmortpt =  ^ infantmortpt
where   15
6:5 is the ratio of the world bank estimates to the vital statistics registry esti-
mates. In this case, each recorded infant death represents  total infant deaths, so that
the lower bound for FracMWS of 6.5 is actually FracMWS = 15. This implies that the 30
Baht program led to a reduction in infant mortality of 15 deaths per 1,000 births among the
MWS, a 50% reduction relative to a baseline infant mortality rate of 30 for the MWS group
(because the pre-30 Baht relationship was 6.5, which, multipled by , yields 15, so that the
MWS infant mortality rate was 15 points higher than the mean of 15). This implies the 30
Baht program led to an aggregate reduction in infant mortality in Thailand of at least 4.5
per 1,000 births (15*0.3=4.5).
Third, suppose the 30 Baht program increases the reporting of infant mortality deaths,
as my be expected because of the increase in hospital utilization and the higher propensity to
report infant deaths if they occur in a hospital (Tangcharoensathien et al, 2006 [Tangcharoen-
sathien et al., 2006]). Since utilization increases were largest amongst the MWS group, this
type of measurement error would lead to an increase in reporting of MWS infant deaths
under the 30 Baht program. This renders our estimate of 6.5 per 1,000 births a further
understatement of the true eﬀect on the MWS group, and 2/1,000 remains a valid lower
bound estimate of the impact of the 30 Baht program on the aggregate infant mortality rate
in Thailand.
20Spillovers Since our empirical approach for the impact of the program on infant mor-
tality is at the provincial level, we cannot immediately rule out the potential that the 30
Baht program lowered infant mortality for non-MWS individuals in areas with lots of MWS
enrollees. Thus, our estimates of 6.5 per 1,000 births for the impact on the MWS group
could be an overstatement of the impact of the program on the MWS group if some of these
reductions accrued to the non-MWS groups in areas with a high fraction of MWS enrollees.
However, even if this is the case, our estimates for the aggregate impact on infant mortality
of 2 per 1,000 births remain a valid aggregate lower bound. Moreover, to the extent to which
the program did improve the infant mortality rate for the non-MWS group overall (not just
in high-MWS areas) our results understate the true impact of the program on the infant
mortality rate of the MWS group.
6 Conclusion
Our paper has shown the complicated responses that can arise when countries reform their
health care systems to increase access for underserved populations. The 30 Baht program
in Thailand did increase care for the uninsured, along with shifting that care partially from
private to public settings. But there were even stronger eﬀects on the care of those who
were previously insured, but for whom the government was under-reimbursing health care
providers. Although such utilization results are context speciﬁc, Thailand was not unique
among developing countries in having an under-funded free care program for the poor. Thus,
the re-imbursement impacts are likely to be of quite important for other countries considering
healthcare reform.
In addition to showing the utilization increased amongst the poor, this paper also con-
tributes to the literature on the impact of health services on health and the disparities in
health across countries. In particular, our results suggest that access to healthcare has the
ability to reduce infant mortality amongst the poor. Indeed, the sharp reduction in infant
21mortality observed between 2000 and 2002 is consistent with the fact that the most com-
mon causes of infant mortality in the world are from treatable diseases, such as dehyration
(associated with diarrhea), pneumonia, and infection ([Dupas, 2011]). Given the relatively
large magnitudes of our estimates (6.5/1000 for the MWS group), our results suggest that
improved access to medical services could go a long way to improve the large disparities in
infant mortality rates both across and within countries.
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 ﾠ(D-ﾭ‐in-ﾭ‐D)
Control
Age 35.8 37.7 0***
Female 0.530 0.528 0.570
Employed 0.682 0.711 0***
UNINS
1
Age 32.5 33.4 0*** 0***
Female 0.523 0.526 0.120 0.204
Employed 0.631 0.657 0*** 0.662
MWS
Age 29.7 30.5 0.021** 0.002***
Female 0.525 0.523 0.636 0.930
Employed 0.310 0.318 0.390 0.02**
Sample	 ﾠSize 200,926 182,543
1Includes	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠwho	 ﾠowned	 ﾠ500	 ﾠBaht	 ﾠcards	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2001
Table	 ﾠ1:	 ﾠSummary	 ﾠStatisticsGroup Pre	 ﾠ30	 ﾠBaht Post	 ﾠ30	 ﾠBaht Difference
All	 ﾠGroups 0.0665 0.0701 0.0036**
(0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0017)
Control 0.0793 0.0789 -ﾭ‐0.0004
(0.0034) (0.0041) (0.0027)
UNINS 0.0585 0.0606 0.0021
(0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0017)
MWS 0.0711 0.0792 0.0081***
(0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0027)
Difference
UNINS	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠControl -ﾭ‐0.0207*** -ﾭ‐0.0182*** 0.0025
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0023)
MWS	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠControl -ﾭ‐0.0082** 0.0003 0.0085***
(0.0035) (0.0038) (0.0032)
Standard	 ﾠerrors	 ﾠclustered	 ﾠby	 ﾠprovince	 ﾠ(70	 ﾠprovinces)
***	 ﾠp<.01,	 ﾠ**	 ﾠp<.05,	 ﾠ*	 ﾠp<.10
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Figure 3: Effect of Fraction MWS on Infant Mortality